The South Won\u27t Rise Again but It\u27s Time to Study the Defunct Confederacy\u27s Constitution by Stein, Ralph Michael
Pace Law Review 
Volume 21 
Issue 2 Spring 2001 Article 3 
April 2001 
The South Won't Rise Again but It's Time to Study the Defunct 
Confederacy's Constitution 
Ralph Michael Stein 
Pace University School of Law, rstein@law.pace.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr 
Recommended Citation 
Ralph Michael Stein, The South Won't Rise Again but It's Time to Study the Defunct 
Confederacy's Constitution, 21 Pace L. Rev. 395 (2001) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more 
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
The South Won't Rise Again But It's Time




I. INTRODUCTION ................................. 395
II. THE CONFEDERACY AS CONSTITUTIONAL
COUNTER-REVOLUTION ........................ 398
III. THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
TEACHING CONSTITUTINAL LAW TODAY ..... 405
IV. CONCLUSION .................................... 408
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a simple fact that for a short, but significant, period in
American history two governments existed with highly similar,
but also markedly divergent, seminal constitutions. One gov-
ernment was de jure,' in light of force of arms and constitu-
tional law, and the other de facto,2 because of having failed at
revolution. The Confederate States of America, repudiated first
by military and naval debacle and then by constitutional law,3
existed from 1861 to 1865. 4
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. Portions of this article
concerning the history of the Constitution of the Confederate States of America
were first delivered as speeches before several historical societies. I very much
appreciate the continuing and influential encouragement of my friend and col-
league, Associate Dean and Professor of Law Michael B. Mushlin. Professor
Mushlin is a true son of the South, who still bemoans the accidental torching of his
Meridian, Mississippi home town during General Sherman's benevolent operations
there.
1. The Union can be categorized as a de jure government, one "[e]xisting by
right or according to law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 437 (7th ed. 1999).
2. As a de facto government, the Confederacy was "[i]llegitimate but in ef-
fect." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999).
3. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
4. See generally, E. MERTON COULTER, THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA
1861-1865: A HISTORY OF THE SOUTH (Wendell Holmes Stephenson & E. Merton




It may well be true that in the post-Vietnam War period,
interest in the Civil War increased. Whatever the tawdry gift
shops of Gettysburg or the well-tended battlefields in a number
of states may contribute to revenue from tourism, the reality is
that relatively few persons concern themselves with the consti-
tutional and political history of the Civil War. To the extent
that some have that interest, their attention (and money) is
largely drawn towards the turmoil of the Lincoln presidency.
Much focus is on the unresolved, and possibly unresolvable,
questions as to the President's true commitment to abolishing
slavery, his allegedly lackadaisical concern about protecting
civil liberties, and the freedom of the press. 5
The complex ideological and legalistic justification for
Southern secession has largely been lost. Southern secession
was a result of a process that created disunion and fomented a
rebellion, leading to the costliest war in United States history.
However, those individuals interested in the Civil War have
largely devoted their time, energy and money to studying cam-
paigns and battles, winners and losers, weapons that worked
and those that did not.6 Even those of us who teach Constitu-
tional Law have permitted the contrasting and provocative dia-
lectical theories of generally unknown Southern lawyers and
political idealists to remain hidden from the view of students.
The premise of this essay is not to espouse that the South-
ern ideological and constitutional theorists were correct. I pro-
pose, however, that an understanding of the historical basis of
constitutional law, and a recognition of evolving doctrinal issues
of Federalism, will enhance law school curriculum. Presenta-
tion of these topics dictates the introduction of the Confederate
5. See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century,
1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1444 (1998), for an exposition of President Lincoln's con-
duct with regard to the suppression of civil liberties during the Civil War. There
are probably more books and articles about Abraham Lincoln than about any other
president. His conduct during office, especially his conception of his powers under
the Constitution, is beyond the scope of this article. The controversy as to whether
his actions were within the confines of his constitutional authority, or whether he
subverted the Constitution to save the Union, is enduring, divisive, and not infre-
quently related to contemporary issues and ongoing agendas.
6. See TONY HORWITZ, CONFEDERATES IN THE ATTIC: DISPATCHES FROM THE UN-
FINISHED CIVIL WAR (1998), for an interesting and accurate account of not only the
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Constitution into the curriculum of required courses and elec-
tives. This effort, I propose, would be a prudent step, to be am-
ply repaid in terms of higher understanding and scholarly
benefit.
I confess at the outset my lifelong love of history for its own
sake. This, however, is not the motivation for this short article.
I hope to encourage colleagues to step back and consider recast-
ing their Constitutional Law courses to increase student aware-
ness of the influence of history. Much can be gained by focusing
specifically on the failed experiment of eleven Southern states.7
The heritage of slavery and the bitterness of four years of com-
bat continue to linger with us. Confederate political and mili-
tary iconography are not simply objects for sale at Civil War
artifact shows. They continue to cause political division as citi-
zens object to flags of "The Lost Cause" being displayed on pub-
lic buildings.8 Their private display, while surely protected by
the First Amendment, stimulate passion and, occasionally, seri-
ous violence.9 The strength of such symbolism springs from un-
settled issues, the most prominent revolving around race and
the heritage of slavery. As I will attempt to illustrate further,
the customary examination of race in Constitutional Law
courses minimizes or disregards the continuing impact of
America's Civil War experience.
Understanding Confederate constitutional doctrine may
also be helpful in examining contemporary Supreme Court deci-
7. Putting aside the military history of the Civil War and the actions of com-
manders and common soldiers, a remarkably stable civil government existed in the
seceded states for much of the Civil War. A government largely mirroring the
Northern government functioned, but with variations in substance and procedure.
Of course, most Southern politicians were experienced in serving in the national
government, often with high rank. Their fundamental differences were not with
the political structure of the U.S. government.
8. See, e.g., Scott McCabe, Lake City Logo is NAACP's Next Battle in Rebel
Flag War, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 16, 2001, available in 2001 WL 14129338
("Fresh from rebel flag victories in Georgia and South Carolina, the NAACP is
traveling south into Florida to attack its next target - the Lake City Logo."). See
also Eugene Kane, Symbol of Confederacy is No Banner of Honor, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Feb. 4, 2001, available in 2001 WL 9337173.
9. See, e.g., Robert L. Kaiser, Confederate Flag Can Still Draw Blood in a
Small Town, The Stars and Bars of the Confederacy Proved in a Deadly Fashion
the Weight it Carries for Some in the South, CHI. TRIB., March 19, 2000, available




sions. For example, McCulloch v. Maryland ° is still the formal-
istic pronunciamento that the federal union was created by the
people and not the states. Justice Thomas's dissent in U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton," a five-to-four decision, may well
adumbrate an emerging majority that accepts what was a major
pillar of Confederate constitutional theory. 12
II. THE CONFEDERACY AS CONSTITUTIONAL
COUNTER-REVOLUTION
If one word can encompass the panoply of emotions that
captivated many Southerners, driving them to seek disunion,
"estrangement" is probably the best. More than "alienation,"
which certainly was also detectable in copious amounts, "es-
trangement" in political life, as in intimate personal relation-
ships, reflects loss of what was once held dear, cherished, and
respected.
As a result of this estrangement, the sentiment "A Govern-
ment of Our Own" was frequently heard in the late 1850's.13 It
was an expression that became increasingly strident and com-
mon as the crisis of secession approached. Choosing that ex-
pression as the title of his book, historian William C. Davis, a
specialist in Civil War biography and military analysis, noted
the deepening sense of betrayal sensed by many Southerners
began, not with the emergence of Abraham Lincoln, but almost
immediately after the ratification of the federal Constitution. 4
While secession looks like revolution, and in the legal sense has
been so regarded, for many Southerners the key word and con-
cept was restoration.
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
11. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
12. In essence the most fundamental Confederate constitutional plank was
that the Union was formed by the states, not by the people. This is, of course, the
exact opposite of the Supreme Court's McCulloch holding, perhaps one of the few
bedrock Constitutional principles that lawyers never forget from their law school
days.
13. See WILLIAM C. DAvis, A GOVERNMENT OF OUR OWN (1994).
14. See id. Davis's book is one of the few non-specialist works to explore Con-
federate political theory and the men (women were no more enfranchised or em-
powered in forming the Confederate union than they had been with its
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Today's typical introductory Constitutional Law course
runs from Marbury v. Madison15 to United States v. Morrison.16
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 has been acknowledged
as a work of compromise. 17 To a significant degree it was an
effort to accommodate slaveholding states and their fear of en-
circlement and disempowerment. 8 Although this is acknowl-
edged, it is rarely explored in any depth. For example, The
Federalist Papers clearly foresaw the doctrine of judicial review,
with regard to both enactments of Congress and decisions of the
state courts.' 9 The unease fostered by the Marshall Court's ar-
ticulation and application of that doctrine is, however, buried
beneath analysis of the concept itself.20
The need for a union that would be able to thwart oppres-
sion or territorial aggrandizement by European powers, insured
that the mounting concern with the power of the Supreme
Court would remain relatively muted in the early Republic pe-
riod. Nonetheless, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee2' must have dis-
turbed many thinking Southerners, and more than a few in the
North. It is studied mainly as the case that insured that judi-
cial review of state court decisions would bring about national
15. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
16. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
17. See, e.g., Bryan K. Fair, A Constitutional Law Casebook for the 21s' Cen-
tury: A Critical Essay on Cohen and Varat, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 859, 869 (1998);
Sonny Swazo, The Future of High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal, State Sovereignty
and the Tenth Amendment: Nevada v. Watkins, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 127, 136
(1996); Paul V. Niemeyer, The Gerrymander: A Journalistic Catch-Word or Consti-
tutional Principle? The Case in Maryland, 54 MD. L. REV. 242, 257 (1995);
Suzanna Sherry, Our Unconstitutional Senate, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 213, 214
(1995).
18. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS]; cf Paul Finkleman, Teaching Slavery in Ameri-
can Constitutional Law, 34 AKRON L. REV. 261, 261 (2000) ("Slavery led to two
major political compromises of the antebellum period, as well as the most politi-
cally divisive Supreme Court in our history.").
19. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
20. The concern about judicial power, as reflected by the doctrine of judicial
review, was by no stretch of the imagination restricted to the South. The South,
however, was developing what became a well-honed and not entirely irrational
sense of political isolation. The implications of judicial review were particularly
disturbing to a region populated by many Jeffersonians, successors in interest to
the Anti-Federalists.
21. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
5
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uniformity.22 It was that uniformity that was considered cen-
tral to Federalist political ideology. 23 The upholding of Section
XXV of the Judiciary Act of 178924 exposed raw fears about the
loss of states' rights to an increasingly intrusive Supreme
Court.
Disunion, like divorce, rarely springs from one act. Rather,
a festering situation worsens until it becomes intolerable. At
the time of Martin, the memory of Washington being nearly
burned to the ground was fresh in the nation's mind. It was a
sharp lesson in maintaining a union, honoring treaty obliga-
tions, and preventing further military misadventures for the
young nation; the Battle of New Orleans notwithstanding.
From today's classroom perspective, Martin completed the judi-
cial interpretation of the Federalist blueprint for judicial re-
view. However, to many in the South it augured a threat to
slavery, the all-critical underpinning of any concept of states
rights.25
While the Supreme Court essentially avoided applying ju-
dicial review in the decades following articulation of the doc-
trine, Southern fears of encirclement increased exponentially.
A number of reasons accounted for the growing estrangement
and distrust. They included the developing industrialization of
the North as compared to the continuing agrarian-based South-
22. A clear reading of Martin reflects its obvious potential implication for the
claim of states' rights in any area, including, most ominously for the South,
slavery.
23. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 51 (James
Madison).
24. See Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 351.
25. This article cannot explore in depth the continuing debate as to whether
slavery was the underlying and controlling cause of secession. Some Southern
apologists, as well as respected academic historians, continue to deny that it was.
They claim, without any evidence, that slavery would have ended in time without
war. To those observers, Southern constitutional theory was rooted solely in a be-
lief that states' rights, guaranteed under the federal constitution, had been abro-
gated. Thus, slavery was secondary to a demand for a compact that reified the
values of 1787. I have never received a satisfactory answer to a simple question
that I have personally posited to historians and advocates of that view: Would se-
cession ever have occurred BUT FOR the issue of slavery? To me the answer is
self-evident, and it is "no." See MARSHALL L. DERoSA, THE CONFEDERATE CONSTI-
TUTION OF 1861 (1991). Professor DeRosa, a political scientist, has provided, in a
slim volume, the best analysis of the competing views as to the relative importance
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ern economy, the influx of immigrants in the North, and west-
ward expansion. There was also a concomitant rise of militant
abolitionist movements targeting slavery in the South, after
having successfully seen its demise throughout the Northern
states. Last, but not least, there were revolts by slaves, both
real and imagined. Such acts not only threatened the lives of
Southerners, but also cast serious doubt on the theory of benig-
nity by which many sought to defend slavery. These are not
issues that are generally discussed when dealing with the his-
tory of race in the law school classroom, at least not in a re-
quired course.
Many will agree that the Dred Scott case is probably the
most institutionally damaging in the history of the Supreme
Court.26 Stated simply, Northerners, particularly abolitionists,
were incensed that Dred Scott was not recognized as a person
for the purposes of pursuing his claim for manumission. 27 Addi-
tionally, Southerners recognized that they had, at best, a Pyr-
rhic victory in that an essentially favorable opinion merely
animated and incensed their enemies, while giving scant assur-
ance of protecting their interests.
The impetus for secession, and what was perceived by
Northerners as the restoration of a dishonored constitution and
federal system that insured primacy of the individual subscrib-
ing states, surged after the Dred Scott decision and its accompa-
nying debates. The intensification of endemic sectional and
slavery-based violence in Kansas ("Bloody Kansas") and parts of
Missouri, with neither federal nor state authority able to con-
tain its excesses, led a growing minority of Southerners to ques-
tion whether the Union should, let alone could, be preserved.
In state assemblies, in meetings held formally and other-
wise, the renewed possibility of secession segued into a develop-
ing belief as to its inevitability. Unlike the delegates to the
Federal Convention of 1787,28 who exceeded their warrant to
amend the Articles of Confederation by ditching them entirely,
26. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Anyone teach-
ing Constitutional Law today need not fear that students will bring inaccurate or
sketchy information about this case to the class discussion. On a yearly basis I can
count on two hands the number of students with any recognition of Dred Scott
prior to reading assigned material.
27. See generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE (1978).




the Southern political theorists had a handy model for a new
federal union of seceded states. That model, of course, was the
U.S. Constitution. This was a document about which they had
few misgivings, but whose implementation and interpretation
by the Supreme Court lay at the heart of state and regional es-
trangement with Washington.
As with the original American Revolution, those favoring
secession could be classified into two general camps of "fire-
brands" and "moderates.'"2 9 Not surprisingly, as with the ear-
lier cataclysmic event, lawyers in the South tended to caution
and to seek a new union that largely preserved the benefits of
the one being left.30 The Confederate Constitution that
emerged virtually copies its ancestor, but with some important
deviations. 31 The drafters of the Confederate Constitution may
well have thought of themselves as largely improving, rather
than replacing, the federal constitution. However, a close com-
parative reading illuminates not only the issues of the antebel-
lum and Civil War era, but current constitutional arguments
and theories.
The preamble articulates instantly the dominant Southern
concept of state rights: the new union is formed not by the peo-
ple, as Chief Justice Marshall articulated in McCulloch, but by
"each State acting in its sovereign and independent charac-
ter. '32 The preamble thus answers both Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee and McCulloch v. Maryland obliquely but, nonetheless,
emphatically. Illustrating the difference a word can make, the
term "granted," with regard to the federal Union's legislative
powers for the nascent republic, is changed in the document to
"delegated."33 This is not a casual substitution.
Dropping subtlety, but not the numerical equation, the
Confederate document retains the three-fifths apportionment to
deal with state representation in the Confederate Congress. 34
29. See generally DEROSA, supra note 25.
30. See id; DAvis, supra note 13.
31. See The Constitution of the Confederate States of America, infra note 47.
This is the copy I use in both required and advanced courses.
32. CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, PREAMBLE (1861)
[hereinafter CONFEDERATE CONST.], reprinted in CHARLES ROBERT LEE, JR., THE
CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTIONS app. C (Greenwood Press 1974) (1963).
33. CONFEDERATE CONST. art. I, § 1.
34. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
[Vol. 21:395
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss2/3
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But the "other persons" language of the federal constitution,
which everyone understood as meaning slaves, is replaced with
the more honest word "slaves."35 Protection of slavery was, of
course, the critical raison d'etre of the entire Southern experi-
ment. Interestingly, the language of the federal constitution's
non-importation clause was largely followed, but with the added
proviso that the importation of slaves from non-Confederate
states or territories was forbidden. 36
A number of structural innovations in the constitution for
the new nation do not deal with slavery, but may be viewed as a
rejection of fundamental Federalist principles which were be-
lieved to falsely accord due regard to state authority. For exam-
ple, limiting the Confederacy's president and vice-president to
one six-year term with the president being ineligible for re-elec-
tion seems to evidence a fear of a powerful chief executive.37
What the Confederate Constitution did grant to its Chief Execu-
tive was a power every modern president has desired: the line
item veto. 38 The Confederate Constitution had other provisions
35. Id.
36. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. However, it is questionable how strong the interest
was in enforcing this non-importation prohibition.
37. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. No constitution can safeguard a government
against the passions and follies of human beings holding office. Throughout the
four years of the Confederacy, President Jefferson Davis and Vice-President Alex-
ander Stephens were at such irresolvable division that a group of followers encir-
cled each politician. This ensured a minimum of cooperation and a maximum of
bitter dispute, which permeated every level of Confederate political and military
functioning. So antagonistic was Stephens to Davis that he spent most of the Con-
federacy's short life in his native Georgia, not exactly a vantage point conducive to
cooperative work with his president, had he wanted to be helpful (which he did
not).
38. See id. art. I, § VII, cl. 2. I have found it very useful to discuss in class this
Confederate "improvement" on the U.S. Constitution, which has not been added
despite decades of presidents arguing for its utility, indeed its necessity. Currently
the line item veto is a power possessed and utilized by governors in forty-three
states. See Steven Heufter, The Supreme Court's Avoidance of the Nondelegation
Doctrine in Clinton v. City of New York." More Than "A Dime's Worth of Difference,"
49 CATH. U. L. REV. 337, 376 (2000). Many candidates for office, including Ronald
Reagan, fought for a presidential line item veto. See Eric Stephen Schmitt, There
is no Joy in D.C., the Mighty Court Struck Out: An Analysis of Clinton v. City of
New York, The Line Item Veto Act and the Court's Failure to Uphold Constitution-
ally Legitimate Means to a Viable End, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 167, 170 (2000). In
twenty-five years I have had two students who knew about the Confederate con-
cept of the line item veto before studying the subject with me. Knowing of the
antecedent experiment affects how a student views and analyzes the two hundred
and ten year-plus federal model.
9
PACE LAW REVIEW
unrelated to slavery, which simply reflect a view of how the fed-
eral government functioned from ratification of the Constitution
through the antebellum era.39
From the perspective of constitutional lawyers, scholars,
and students, what the Confederate document mandated, but
which ultimately was never carried into effect, is the establish-
ment of a Confederate "Superior Court" (as opposed to "Su-
preme Court") and a system of inferior courts.40  The
Confederate Article III virtually mirrors the antecedent federal
provision with the same number. The Confederate Congress
never established such a court. The reasons for this nonfea-
sance are complex and multifaceted. Above all, however, was
the consensual rejection of the authority of a national juridical
tribunal with the power to bind, by its decisions, the states that
voluntarily entered the new confederation. Thus, it was not the
language of the Confederate Constitution's Article III, but the
overwhelming fear of, and rejection of, a national unifying legal
tribunal. This is explained by the four-year history of the Con-
federacy, with each state's highest court the final and absolute
arbiter of Confederate national law.41
From the perspective of Southern partisans, then and now,
the Confederacy was based upon a corrective and amendatory
concept of the American experience. The original seminal com-
39. For example, the Confederate president enjoyed a clearly articulated and
broad dismissal power with regard to executive branch officers below diplomatic
and cabinet level. See CONFEDERATE CONST. art. II, § II, cl. 2. Interestingly, the
Confederate Constitution, in following the model for creating a federal postal ser-
vice, mandated that the post office be self-sustaining by March 1, 1863. See id. art.
I, § 8, cl. 7. Amazingly, this was achieved during an expensive and debilitating
war.
40. Both terms, "Superior" and "Supreme" were used in different drafts of the
Confederate Constitution.
41. It would be a gross and untenable exaggeration to claim that the Confed-
eracy was defeated by the lack of a system of federal laws interpreted by a high
court vested with judicial review. But it cannot be gainsaid that the lack of such a
system clearly and frequently hurt the Confederacy. By 1864, highly partisan
state judges invalidated, or made impossible to implement, a host of laws. Confed-
erate statutes directly relating to conscription and other critical war-related dilem-
mas enjoyed contradictory interpretations and non-enforcement in the shrinking
Confederacy. As discussed infra, the heuristic example of the Confederate Govern-
ment, largely paralleled in political institutions and organic law to the federal
model, but without a unifying court system OR the doctrine of judicial review,
brings students to a sharper perception of the role ofjudicial review and an appre-
ciation of rational, if not controlling, objections to it.
404 [Vol. 21:395
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss2/3
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pact was not critically flawed; it was abandoned in principle
and in practice. Administrations, either hostile to the South or
impotent to restrain its perfervid enemies, threatened not only
slavery but also the underlying sovereignty of the states. While
the emergence and election of Lincoln functioned as an unstop-
pable catalyst for secession, the underlying power of the Su-
preme Court and the ability of that tribunal to nullify federal
and state law, made the path to secession irreversible.
III. THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTION AND
TEACHING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW TODAY
I believe that teaching history is a critical part of teaching
Constitutional Law. This is true whether the subject is judicial
review, the Commerce Clause, or more recent issues such as the
claimed right to assisted suicide, the right to privacy and auton-
omy, or the application of the First Amendment to situations
unknown to the amendment's framers. I do not dismiss the rel-
evance of economic theory in understanding constitutional doc-
trine, but for me that is largely the application of concepts
derived from historical experience.
After twenty-five years of teaching, I certainly understand
how limited time is for instructional purposes, as well as how
much must be covered in three-credit, four-credit, or even two-
credit courses. I suggest that incorporation of material dealing
with the Confederate Constitution can be achieved with little
effort, that it will be well received and that a far greater under-
standing of some current constitutional issues will result. This,
of course, reflects a somewhat optimistic attempt to induce
others to do what I have already done, and also for them to gar-
ner the same pedagogical rewards.
I start with the premise that virtually all casebooks provide
inadequate historical material, although some are better than
others.42 However, the key failing of most is that they reflect
42. By way of unsolicited endorsement, for years I have used the casebook,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 3rd ed. 1996), supplemented
annually. Although this casebook delves into historical material more deeply than
most of its competitors, it is still not adequate for my teaching goals with regard to
historical material. For almost twenty years I have required that all students tak-
ing Constitutional Law I read ROBERT G. MCCLOSKY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME




the Federalist view as if it is almost unchallengeable. The
casebook I use liberally reproduces useful excerpts from The
Federalist Papers while largely ignoring compelling arguments
put forth by the anti-Federalists. 43
My approach has been to ask students if they can discern
what I call "Constitutional Wisdom" in the comments of the
casebook editors. By "Constitutional Wisdom" I mean the
transmogrification of announced doctrine into supposedly im-
permeable statements of truth, almost "Constitutional Folk-
lore," if you will. McCulloch is a good example. Chief Justice
Marshall's hallowed utterance that "it is a constitution we are
expounding"44 is considered by many to be a juridical pro-
nouncement of the greatest importance. Justice Frankfurter re-
gards Marshall's statement as his "greatest judicial
pronouncement" and "the pole-star for constitutional adjudica-
tions."45 A plausible argument exists to sustain that view, but
students regard this often quoted "Marshallism" differently
when viewed in the light of anti-Federalist political and judicial
theory. Perhaps some members of the present Supreme Court
are arriving at a less than exalted view of the doctrine en-
shrined in McCulloch and wrapped in Marshall's protective, in-
sulating words. 46
Requiring the reading and interpretation of the Confeder-
ate Constitution puts little burden on students. Many copies
are available on-line. I require a particular version, the one ap-
pended to this essay.47 I also encourage students to look for
of past exposure to history in school, the McCloskey book plays an invaluable part
in achieving a level playing field for exploring the Marshall Court.
43. It would be too much to require students to purchase The Anti-Federalist
Papers, published in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION DEBATES (Ralph Ketcham ed., Mentor 1986). However, reproducing, as
handouts, selected papers and introducing "Brutus" and "Centinel" as foils for
"Publius" and friends, brings about an easily controlled (as to time) but expansive
and valuable class discussion.
44. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
45. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 596 (1952).
46. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
47. See The Constitution of the Confederate States of America (visited April 2,
2001) <http://www.civilwarhome.com/csconstitution.htm>. For assured accuracy,
and readability, Yale Law School's on-line version also cannot be beat. The Avalon
Project at Yale Law School: Confederate States of America - Constitution for the
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other versions, and quite a few do. They discover that some on-
line versions have inaccuracies and a few appear to be edited
(doctored) to advance contemporary political agendas.
As indicated previously, the most important issues that can
be explored using the Confederate States Constitution and rele-
vant supplementary material are:
" oppositional views to Federalist political theory;
" the inevitability of judicial review and its impact;
" the contrasting view of the President as afforded by the seces-
sionist document; and
" the reality of race and slavery as dominant formative influ-
ences on both the federal and Confederate constitutions, as well
as the continuing pervasiveness of the race issue. Issues relat-
ing to First Amendment rights, non-justiciable political matters
and the divisive debate about Confederate iconography take on
a different light when studied in the context of the constitu-
tional and political theories surrounding secession in 1861.
Last, I would like to discuss some observations about incor-
porating historical material into Constitutional Law courses, in-
cluding advanced electives, through technology. In the area of
Civil War history alone, the resources available through the
Web are exhaustive, and occasionally exhausting. All of my
courses are fully Web-integrated. I post URLs with the same
requirement that they be accessed and read, as I would expect
of class handouts.
With regard to Constitutional law, the Confederate Consti-
tution and other supplementary materials are but a small por-
tion of the sources that can, and should, be utilized to infuse a
sense of historical relevance in contemporary issues. Casebooks
allow the study of doctrine, almost exclusively at the Supreme
Court level. Facts accepted by the Court are derived from an
often sterile and not infrequently questionable record. Learn-
ing is more by rote acceptance of majority opinions, or enchant-
ment by the words of dissenters and concurring justices, than it
is by broad examination of the underlying issues. 48 Technology
48. For very many years I have been privileged to bring my friend, Irving
Feiner, to meet with each Constitutional Law class. He is the Feiner of Feiner v.
New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), a relic of Cold War fears and insufficient protection
for First Amendment rights. Mr. Feiner is a feisty representative of the "Old Left,"
and continues as a community activist to this date. His appearances transform




affords faculty and students opportunities for meaningful explo-
ration of materials that make understanding constitutional doc-
trine and the workings of the Supreme Court more realistic and
more relevant to grasping the role of counsel in all litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The South will not rise again, at least not in secessionist
revolt. But the anti-Federalist beliefs and values that largely
inflamed the Old South, and which led it to protect slavery, its
most dominant institution, through disunion remain. It is those
beliefs and values that remain. We soon may have a majority of
the Supreme Court who, although not sympathetic, of course, to
either racial prejudice or disunion, may subtly, yet significantly,
reinvigorate some of the Jeffersonian and antebellum theories
doomed by combat and forgotten by most who teach. The Con-
federate Constitution belongs in the Constitutional Law
curriculum.
to ask questions and express amazement at, and fascination with, the world he
describes. The fact that his view of his case deviates drastically from the facts as
reflected in the Supreme Court's opinion, does not detract from the experience for
the students. Rather the opposite occurs; the students see the Court more clearly
as a necessary, but nonetheless real, hostage to a trial record. This lesson is better
learned by a first-hand meeting with Mr. Feiner, than by any degree of casebook
studying.
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